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Abstract 
Research on human interaction has shown that attrib-
uting agency to another agent has substantial conse-
quences for the way we perceive and evaluate its ac-
tions. Specifically, considering an agent’s actions re-
lated to either effort or ability can have important con-
sequences for the attribution of responsibility. This 
study indicates that participants’ interpretation of a ro-
bot failure in terms of effort –as opposed to ability– 
significantly increases their attribution of agency and  
–to some extent– moral responsibility to the robot. 
However a robot displaying lack of effort does not 
lead to the level of affective and behavioural reactions 
of participants normally found in reactions to other 
human agents.   
 Introduction    
Currently, much debate is devoted to the question of how 
we should deal with harm caused by robots (Asaro 2013; 
Singer 2011). Research on anthropomorphism (Duffy 
2003; Złotowski , Strasser & Bartneck 2014), blame 
(Moon & Nass 1998; Serenko 2007; Kim & Hinds 2006; 
You, Nie, Suh & Sundar 2011; Koay, Syrdal, Walters & 
Dautenhahn 2009; Vilaza, Haselager, Campos, & Vuurpijl 
2014; Malle, Scheutz, Arnold, Voiklis, & Cusimano 2015; 
Malle, Scheutz, Forlizzi, & Voiklis 2016) and examples of 
media and pop culture speaking of ‘robot laws’ (Clarke 
1994) underline the possibility of humans –perhaps inap-
propriately– attributing moral responsibility to automated 
systems. Although legal solutions have been proposed for 
dealing with such conflicts (Asaro 2013), in daily life this 
may still have undesired implications. Owners and devel-
opers of robots may (unknowingly) distance themselves 
from potential harms caused by their robots (Coleman 
2004), causing responsibility to become diffused. There-
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fore, it is relevant to find out what factors contribute to the 
attribution of agency and responsibility in robots.   
Extensive work on attributional processes in human in-
teraction reveals that the perception of an agent’s effort 
and abilities are central determinants in the attribution of 
agency and moral responsibility (Weiner 1995). This, in 
turn, is strongly related to fundamental affective and be-
havioural reactions such as sympathy, rejection, altruism 
and aggression (Weiner 1995; Rudolph, Roesch, 
Greitemeyer, & Weiner 2004). Yet, with regard to human 
robot interaction (HRI), little is known about the attribu-
tion of agency and moral responsibility.  
In this study, we applied Weiner’s Theory of Social 
Conduct (Weiner 1995) to HRI by showing participants 
videos of robots (Aldebaran’s NAO) failing tasks in ways 
that could be interpreted as due to either lack of ability 
(LA-condition; e.g. dropping an object) or lack of effort 
(LE-condition; e.g. throwing away an object, fig. 1). We 
expected that a display of lack of effort would incite the 
illusion of a robot having agency over its actions. In addi-
tion, we expected that a robot’s lack of effort would have 
little effect on the attribution of moral responsibility to the 
robot, compared to a display of lack of ability.  
 
 
 
 
Method 
In an online survey, sixty-three participants (MAge = 25,5, 
SD = 9,7; drawn from a university population) were shown 
a video of about 30-60 seconds portraying a situation in 
which a NAO robot was shown failing a task either due to 
lack of ability or lack of effort. Seven of such scenarios 
were presented1. After each video, participants were asked 
to fill in a questionnaire containing scales of agency (five 
questions about the robot’s control over the situation and 
its ability to make its own decisions), and responsibility  
(twelve questions on attributed blame and kindness, affec-
tive and behavioural reactions). Additionally, scales were 
included measuring the participant’s estimate of the robot’s 
experience (e.g. having beliefs, desires, intentions, emo-
tions), predictability, propensity to do damage, trustwor-
thiness and nonanthropomorphic features (e.g. strength, 
efficiency, usefulness)2.  
For analysis, mean scores of each scale (range 1-5) 
were calculated and transposed to Z-scores. Since reliabil-
ity and goodness-of-fit for the scale of responsibility was 
questionable, items of this scale were analyzed separately. 
In order to answer our main questions, a GLM multivariate 
analysis was performed with the composite means of agen-
cy, experience, predictability, propensity to do damage, 
and each item related to responsibility as dependent varia-
bles. Condition (LA/LE) was indicated as between-subject 
factor.  
Results 
According to what was expected, participants attributed 
more agency to a NAO robot after seeing videos in which 
it displayed lack of effort (M = 2.80, SD = 0.82) compared 
to videos in which it displayed lack of ability (M = 2.12, 
SD = 0.61). Univariate tests expressed significant and large 
                                                 
1 Videos and complete survey can be found online: 
https://www.youtube.com/playlist?list=PLSQsUzV48QtG__YPY6kVcgC
M8-YOcNqja; https://eu.qualtrics.com/jfe/preview/SV_6y4TuTii0CFnpch 
2 In this abstract we chose to focus on our main questions only. Therefore, 
additional analyses and results regarding these variables will not be dis-
cussed.   
effects for the composite scores of agency (F(1,61) = 
13.601, p = .000, eta2 = .182), experience (F(1,61) = 
12.235, p = .001, eta2 = .168), and predictability (F(1,61) = 
14.040, p = .000, eta2 = .187). The results for the items of 
responsibility were mixed. While univariate tests for blame 
and disappointment revealed significant, medium effects 
(respectively: F(1, 61) = 5.757, p = .019, eta2 =  .086; F(1, 
61) = 9.704, p = .003, eta2 = .137), effects for the items 
anger, put away, sell, kindness, pity, sympathy, help and 
try again were not significant.  
Conclusion 
Similar to findings related to human interaction, the results 
of our study reveal that, in case of robots displaying behav-
iour that can be interpreted as lack of effort, humans tend 
to explain robotic behaviour by attributing agency. In case 
of failure, a robot displaying lack of effort  –essentially 
refraining from ‘trying’– may lead to blame and disap-
pointment. However, it does not necessarily lead to nega-
tive affective and behavioural reactions such as anger, or 
wanting to shut the robot off and put it away. Results like 
these emphasize that we should be aware of potential dif-
fusion of human responsibility when (advanced) robots 
create the impression that they are agents in the sense of 
actually controlling and intending their own actions. Our 
results also suggest that –in case of NAO robots– failure, 
or even reluctance for doing tasks is received well, illus-
trating a promisingly positive view on robots.  
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